VerityRank

Industry Report

Top 10 Livestock & Poultry Farming Brands

April 2026·VerityRank Research Team

A ranking of livestock and poultry brands seats two companies at the top that do not farm: JBS and Tyson Foods make their money killing, cutting, packing and trading animals rather than raising them, while the company that raises more animals than any other business on earth sits fifth.

That inversion is the finding, not a quirk of scoring. JBS reported US$86.2 billion for FY2025 across more than 500 processing plants in over 190 countries, with daily capacity for 100,000 cattle, 140,000 pigs and 14 million birds on 280,000 staff. Tyson Foods turned over US$54.44 billion with 133,000 employees, more than 100 primary production sites and exports to over 130 countries. Neither income statement is dominated by the barn; both are dominated by the abattoir, the deboning line, the cold chain and the trading desk. Tyson spent 2025 closing beef plants in Kansas and Illinois because live cattle grew too expensive to run through them, which is not a decision a business takes when the animal itself is the margin. A brand table for livestock and poultry therefore measures the middle of the chain, where an animal becomes meat, not the start of it.

The Fortune positions read the same way: two of the ten are Fortune Global 500 members, JBS at 167th on US$77,182.6 million and Tyson Foods at 278th on US$53,309 million, and they are also the only two entrants whose own revenue clears the US$32.2 billion line the 2025 list drew. The list takes the accounts filed for the year it covers, not the latest fiscal year, but the direction holds. On the Livestock & Poultry Brand Authority Index the 90-to-100 band belongs to companies that clear that line on their own books. JBS at US$86.2 billion and Tyson at US$54.4 billion do. WH Group at US$28.03 billion, the largest of the rest, does not, and neither does anyone else. The qualification does not travel: a division or a partly owned subsidiary is scored on the revenue it books itself, which is why the entity filing the group accounts and the company carrying the brand differ.

No entrant tests that boundary harder than New Hope Liuhe. Its parent, New Hope Holding Group, is 426th on the 2025 Fortune list. The company scored here, New Hope Liuhe (SZSE: 000876), is that group's listed subsidiary and inherits nothing from that place. Its own turnover of roughly US$15.0 billion falls well short of US$32.2 billion, and the operation is not the problem: New Hope Liuhe runs over 300 production workshops in more than 10 countries, with feed capacity above 28 million tonnes a year, more than 500 million birds slaughtered and over 16 million hogs raised annually on about 70,000 staff. That is a top-ten industrial footprint, and it lands seventh on 85 points, five points outside the band a subsidiary cannot borrow.

Muyuan is the counterweight, and the reason this table rewards a second reading. It raised 77.981 million hogs in 2025 with 127,600 employees and booked RMB 144.145 billion, about US$20.2 billion, almost all from selling into China; no other entrant draws so much of its revenue from the animal itself. Its slaughtering arm put 28.663 million head through the line, up 128.9% year on year, reached 98.8% capacity utilisation and recorded its first full year of profit, and full production cost fell to RMB 12 per kilogram, the industry's lowest. Muyuan is what this category looks like when the farm is the business. It scores 89, three points behind Tyson and one ahead of WH Group, because US$20.2 billion is still US$20.2 billion under the 30% revenue weight. The index found the strongest pure producer in the field and could not lift it into the 90s, which says more about this category than any number above.

The score column reads 92, 92, 88, 89, 89, 87, 85, 82, 82 and 81 from top to bottom, and it is not monotone: CPF and Muyuan carry 89 in fourth and fifth while WH Group takes third on 88. One point is a rounding distance inside a 35% brand-influence weight, and a brand index may let a name buyers recognise outrank one they do not, provided the reader can see the trade. What matters is the span. Eleven points separate first from last while the revenue behind it runs from US$86.2 billion to US$4.262 billion, a factor of twenty. The weighted tests order this table; the balance sheet supplies one input in four.

Category purity is the input least visible from outside, and it settles several placements. WH Group draws more than half its turnover and over 90% of its operating profit from packaged meat rather than fresh pork, so a group able to process more than 50 million hogs a year is judged as a branded food business, on US$13.5 billion of Chinese revenue. CPF earns in the opposite pattern: about 68% of revenue is booked outside Thailand, against Thai baht 571.135 billion, roughly US$18.2 billion, with net profit up 29% to about US$804 million, and in Vietnam alone it moves 6.8 million pigs and 66 million broilers a year. Two conglomerates, one scored on the label and one on the map.

Fonterra is the only entrant here whose product never walks into an abattoir. It collects and processes more than 16 billion litres of milk a year through 28 large automated plants in New Zealand, exports to over 130 countries and reports NZ$26.0 billion, about US$16.0 billion, on roughly 19,000 staff with about US$4.2 billion of that turnover from China. Its units trade on the NZX and the ASX, but the owners are the dairy farms that fill it, a cooperative arrangement the other nine do not share. The strategy now points away from the shelf: Fonterra is separating its consumer brands, Anchor among them, to concentrate capital on B2B ingredients. A brand index is asked to reward the name on the pack, and the largest structural decision in the group's recent history removes one.

Wens shows what the same industry looks like when the pig housing stays off the balance sheet. It works with 45,000 cooperating farm households, sells more than 30 million hogs and over 1.1 billion birds a year on RMB 103.862 billion, about US$14.6 billion, with 52,000 staff, returning RMB 13.2 billion to those households while bringing its debt-to-asset ratio back to 49.8%. Muyuan builds the barns and owns them; Wens contracts the barns and pays for the output. Seven points separate the two, which is a small distance for two asset structures that different.

The last two entrants approach the category from opposite edges. BRF reports R$65.2 billion, about US$11.8 billion, from 35 plants in Brazil and 5 abroad, shipping to 117 countries, with the Sadia name reaching back to 1934 and halal plants in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Cal-Maine reports US$4.262 billion of revenue and US$1.220 billion of net income, a margin near 28.6% in a business where single digits are normal, on 51.8 million laying hens, over 1.1 billion dozen eggs and 49 layer farms, 50 packing plants and 30 feed mills run by about 4,000 people. It is the only single-category entrant here and the only one with no Chinese revenue at all. Its 2025 result exposes the variable no ownership chart captures: highly pathogenic avian influenza thinned the American flock, prices rose, and the profit was made by the disease, not in spite of it. Biological risk decides which of these companies has a good year, and no weighting hedges it.

Livestock & Poultry Brand Authority Index
VerityRank scores livestock and poultry brands against four weighted tests:
• Brand Influence and Recognition (35%): name recognition among consumers and trade buyers, search interest against the category, and standing on environmental and animal-welfare questions.
• Global Revenue Scale (30%): FY2025 turnover in dollars, the share booked in China, and profit resilience in net income and EBITDA.
• Category Purity and Revenue Share (20%): the share of turnover from meat animals, dairy animals, live poultry and eggs, breeding stock and the feed behind them.
• Global Supply Chain and Production Base (15%): owned plants, slaughterhouses and feed mills, countries operated in and exported to, throughput and staff.
The highest score on this page is 92 and the lowest is 81.

Data Sources
Principal sources include JBS's investor relations disclosures, Tyson Foods' corporate disclosures, WH Group's corporate profile, CPF's revenue highlights, Muyuan's corporate disclosures, Fonterra's results and disclosures, New Hope Liuhe's corporate disclosures, Cal-Maine Foods' filings and results and the 2025 Fortune Global 500 list. Muyuan, Wens and BRF figures rest on their Shenzhen, Shanghai and Sao Paulo filings and on named trade coverage.

Disclaimer: Figures come from audited statements, exchange filings and company publications, and Fortune positions are read from the published 2025 list rather than inferred from turnover. VerityRank accepts no payment from any company for inclusion, exclusion or position. Amounts stay in the reporting currency, dollar equivalents are approximate, and financial years end on different dates. Fortune membership belongs to the entity that files consolidated accounts for the group and does not pass down to a division, a brand or a partly owned subsidiary; here that separates New Hope Holding Group at 426th from the listed operating company scored. Segment and group totals are not interchangeable, and every score attaches to the entity named on the card, so revenue booked by a parent, a shareholder or a brand licensor is treated as distinct from the operating revenue of the company being scored.

Top ranked

  1. 01JBS S.A.92
  2. 02Tyson Foods, Inc.92
  3. 03WH Group Limited88

10 Ranked · 6 Countries · 2026.11

Top 10 Rankings

Edition 2026.11

JBS S.A. is a Brazilian meat group founded in 1953 in Goiás and run from São Paulo, and it is the largest company on this page: US$86.2 billion of FY2025 revenue and US$2.02 billion of net income. Its 2025 Fortune Global 500 entry is 167th at US$77,182.6 million, filed under the Netherlands, because the listed parent is now JBS N.V., an Amsterdam-domiciled holding company, while the cattle, the plants and the 280,000 staff are Brazilian. The list admitted members at US$32.2 billion, so 92/100 marks a group reporting two and a half times the qualifying turnover on its own account.

What JBS owns is slaughter and fabrication capacity rather than farmland. More than 500 processing plants, feed mills and feedlots across 20-plus countries kill 100,000 cattle, 140,000 pigs and 14 million birds a day, and output reaches more than 190 markets. Most animals are bought from producers rather than bred internally, so the group carries less biological risk than a farm-owning peer and takes cattle and hog prices straight onto its margin. Weight on the balance sheet buys throughput, and throughput is what lets volume shift between export destinations when one market closes.

Revenue divides into four blocks — North America at 51 percent, South America at 29 percent, Australia and Europe at 15.5 percent, and the Middle East and Asia at 4.5 percent — each running on a different protein. Seara carries poultry and pork out of Brazil, Friboi carries Brazilian beef and Pilgrim's Pride carries chicken in the United States. Cattle, hog and poultry cycles seldom turn together, so a collapse in one protein lands on part of the group instead of all of it. No competitor here holds comparable capacity in all three, and that explains the first place better than any plant count.

The 2025 reorganisation is the year's decisive change. Shareholders exchanged their stock for paper in JBS N.V., which trades in New York beside the existing B3 line, opening US index products and a wider debt market to a family-controlled group. It also leaves a Dutch-registered issuer holding Brazilian slaughterhouses and changes how the Fortune Global 500 files the company, as a Netherlands entrant. The move buys financial reach without dismantling an operating structure built since 1953, but it shifts the group's regulatory centre of gravity away from the country that supplies its cattle.

China absorbs about US$4.5 billion of group sales, and the route in is shipments of beef and poultry rather than branded packs on Chinese shelves: Seara closed 2025 with its highest export volume on record and Friboi held its share of South American beef. Capacity added over the year points the same way — a halal platform in Oman, a US$135 million breakfast-sausage line in Iowa and a US$150 million plant in Saudi Arabia aim at buyers who pay for certification rather than commodity tenders. Those food-service positions are ones a Brazilian beef base alone would not support.

Two pressures bear on the next two years. The United States cattle herd has fallen to multi-decade lows, and the North American block that produces half the revenue absorbed record cattle costs in FY2025, thinning the margin on the group's largest business. The second is political: Greenpeace and allied groups opened legal proceedings against the proposed US$2.5 billion Nigerian plant, arguing that expansion rests on environmental claims the group cannot evidence. Both attach to the same vulnerability — JBS earns its money moving animals through owned plants and depends on capital and customers who watch how those animals are raised.

Founded

1953

Workforce

280,000

Facilities

500+ processing plants, feed mills and feedlots in 20+ countries

Presence

190+ countries

HQ

São Paulo, Brazil

Market cap

$39.7 B

Market

NYSE: JBS
Food & Beverage BrandsFood & BeverageAgricultural Products

Tyson Foods appears twice in this round and leads one of the two tables, which is a different result from the one the register arithmetic produces elsewhere. It ranks second on the frozen brand index and first on the supply index with 92/100. The 2025 Fortune Global 500 places it 278th on revenue of US$53,309 million, well clear of the US$32.2 billion admission line, and its own accounts report US$54.44 billion for FY2025 with net income of US$474 million. Together with Nestlé it is one of only two companies on these tables that is both a register member and above that line.

The frozen and prepared business is nonetheless the smaller half of a protein company. Prepared foods and retail frozen chicken turn over about US$10.8 billion, roughly 19.9 percent of sales, and the plants behind that figure run 72 million pounds a week of cooked prepared output, roughly 1.7 million tonnes a year, on top of 42 million birds slaughtered weekly. Jimmy Dean holds frozen breakfast sandwiches and sausage, State Fair holds corn dogs, Hillshire Farm covers smoked meats, and the Tyson brand carries breaded nuggets, tenders and prepared steaks. None of this makes Tyson a frozen food company; it makes the freezer the highest-margin exit for a supply chain that starts with breeder flocks.

Integration is the operating model and the argument for the score. Tyson hatches its own breeder stock, mills its own feed, grows and slaughters and further processes, and refuses contract manufacturing rather than renting someone else's line. That chain removes the margin an outside supplier would take and gives the group control of batch standardisation, which is what foodservice buyers actually purchase. It also ties group costs to agricultural cycles the company does not set: the US cattle herd is at historically low levels, live cattle prices have run high, and beef margins absorb part of what chicken and prepared foods earn.

The asset base is large and mostly owned. More than 100 primary production sites, exports reaching over 130 countries and 133,000 employees sit behind the frozen range. In China, plants at Nantong, Rizhao and Xiaogan form three smart frozen bases supplying both retail and chain restaurants, with China sales above US$1.2 billion in a market where local processors compete on price and Tyson competes on specification. The 2025 integration of Crepini Foods and Echo Lake Foods pushes the group further into frozen breakfast prepared foods, a category that carries better margins than commodity cuts.

The supply index weights manufacturing strength at 40 percent, frozen-category purity at 25 percent, group sales at 20 percent and brand reach and channel penetration at 15 percent; on the brand index, 40 percent sits on global sales and international influence. Tyson answers the first, third and fourth weights directly and is held back only by the 19.9 percent purity figure. Nothing here is inherited. The company files its own consolidated accounts, the register entry belongs to Tyson Foods, Inc. as the reporting entity, and the rank does not descend to any brand inside the group; Jimmy Dean's shelf position transfers no points to anyone else on these tables.

What 92 rests on is the spread between protein cycles. Chicken and prepared foods can carry the group while beef is expensive, and the reverse becomes true as the herd rebuilds; a company with a single protein would already be reporting weaker numbers. The exposure that cannot be hedged is written into the ground and the water. Environmental compliance cases arising from upstream growing operations are a recurring cost of owning the whole chain instead of buying into it, and they will follow the group for as long as it owns the birds.

Founded

1935

Workforce

133,000

Facilities

100+ primary production sites; 7 smart plants and 3 R&D centres in China

Presence

Exports to 130+ countries

HQ

Springdale, Arkansas, United States

Market cap

$22.4 B

Market

NYSE: TSN
Food & BeverageAgricultural ProductsAgricultural Products Brands

WH Group Limited holds two national meat businesses: Shuanghui in China and Smithfield in the United States. The group is listed in Hong Kong as 00288 and keeps its registered home in the Hong Kong SAR, while its two operating centres sit in Luohe, Henan and in Smithfield, Virginia. FY2025 revenue was US$28.03 billion with US$1.591 billion of net income, which leaves it roughly US$4 billion short of the US$32.2 billion entry line used by the 2025 Fortune Global 500, and no membership passes down from a parent or affiliate. That is why it scores 88/100: the top of the band this series keeps for non-members, not a criticism of the operations.

What the group owns is pork processing on two continents: more than 100 slaughtering and processing plants across China, the United States, Poland, Romania and Mexico, capacity to slaughter over 50 million hogs a year, packaged meat sales above 3 million tonnes and 106,000 employees. No other pork company combines Chinese demand and American supply at that scale. The revealing number, though, is not tonnage but where the money is earned.

Packaged meat — hams, sausages, bacon and low-temperature prepared cuts — supplies more than half of group revenue and over 90 percent of operating profit. That mix is what separates WH Group from a pig farmer. A producer sells an animal at whatever the market pays that week, while a company converting the animal into branded packs inside its own plants can hold a price list through the downswing of the hog cycle. China contributes about US$13.5 billion of revenue, close to half the total, and it is the market where the packaged brands run deepest.

The dual structure cuts both ways. Shuanghui sells into the largest pork-consuming market in the world; Smithfield sells into the United States, where pork competes with chicken and beef for the plate and exports to Mexico and Asia absorb the cuts domestic buyers leave. Two demand curves on one balance sheet spread currency and single-market policy risk, but they also expose the group to trade barriers between the two countries its plants stand in, and to two hog supply cycles running at the same time.

Management spent the year tidying the estate rather than enlarging it. Underperforming farms in the United States and Europe were trimmed and the capital moved into automation and higher-value low-temperature prepared meat, where profit per tonne is greatest. Packaged meat stayed above half of revenue through the year, which is the figure management watches: it is the part of the business that sets its own prices, and it is the reason a weaker hog market did not translate into a weaker group.

Where the group goes from US$28.03 billion decides whether it ever crosses the Fortune line. Pork is the cheapest of the major proteins per tonne, so revenue cannot grow far on more hogs alone; it has to come from more processed product per animal and from firmer Chinese pork demand. The other exposure is geopolitical — a single group whose biggest assets and biggest market sit on opposite sides of the Pacific carries tariff risk that no operating improvement can offset.

Founded

1958

Workforce

106,000

Facilities

100+ slaughtering and processing plants in China, the US, Poland, Romania and Mexico

Presence

China, the US, Europe and Mexico

HQ

中国香港

Market cap

$11.3 B

Food & Beverage BrandsFood & BeverageAgricultural Products

In April 2025 Charoen Pokphand Foods agreed to pay about US$1.1 billion for the 23.8 percent of C.P. Pokphand held by Itochu, and that transaction says more about the company than any tonnage figure. C.P. Pokphand was the vehicle carrying the group's Greater China and Vietnam farming and feed assets; buying out the Japanese trading house moved those assets to full ownership and removed the last outside shareholder from the structure. Feed is only part of what CPF does, roughly a quarter of revenue, but the deal was about control of the loop in which that feed is made and consumed.

The loop is the business. Founded in 1978, with group lineage reaching back to 1921, CPF is listed in Bangkok as SET: CPF and reported revenue of THB 571.135 billion in 2025, about US$18.2 billion. Thailand supplied 32 percent of that revenue and international operations 68 percent, spread over 17 countries. Feed accounts for roughly THB 135 billion, about US$3.95 billion, or between 23 and 26 percent of revenue, produced at more than 120 automated feed plants across 17 producing countries and sold into more than 40 markets. Compound feed output is about 17.5 million tonnes, and more than 126,000 people work in the group.

The controlling shareholder is Charoen Pokphand Group, one of Asia's largest privately held conglomerates, and none of that scale transfers. CPF is graded on the THB 571.135 billion on its own books, roughly US$18.2 billion, holds no Fortune Global 500 membership and inherits nothing from the group above it. A parent's consolidated turnover is not a subsidiary's turnover, and where a conglomerate reports on a consolidated basis the subsidiary is still measured on the statements it publishes itself. The 89 reflects that separate account, not the size of the family group above it.

Vertical integration is unusually complete for a feed manufacturer. CPF owns hatcheries and broodstock centres, feed mills, farms and processing plants, and its contract farms take chicks, feed and veterinary support from the same group that later buys back the finished birds and shrimp. Feed demand is therefore largely internal, which cuts the cost of finding customers and steadies volumes through the meat cycle, but it also means the return on a tonne of feed depends on the price of chicken, eggs and shrimp rather than on the feed itself.

Capacity has kept moving into aquaculture. The fourth aquafeed mill in Ca Mau province, Vietnam, with 124,800 tonnes of annual capacity, runs at full load for the Mekong Delta, the most concentrated shrimp-farming region in the country. A recovery in Southeast Asian meat prices lifted quarterly net profit by 349 percent, and the group has been certifying a zero-carbon fresh egg line for export buyers who now ask for that documentation.

The risks are the other side of the same design. Extreme heat and drought across Southeast Asia cut the regional corn crop, and imported feed grain prices transmit quickly into a business whose margins are set by livestock prices, so local mills carry higher storage and transfer costs while they wait for the market to settle. A company that takes a quarter of its revenue from feed but earns its profit from the animals that eat it is valued on the second number, and that is the tension the 89 describes.

Founded

1978

Workforce

126,000+

Facilities

Own hatcheries, broodstock centres, feed mills and processing plants in 17 countries

Presence

17 countries; Thailand 32% of revenue, international 68%

HQ

Bangkok, Thailand

Market cap

$4.9 B

Market

BKK: CPF
Food & BeverageAgricultural ProductsAgricultural Products Brands

Muyuan Foods Group Co., Ltd. (牧原食品股份有限公司) is a vertically integrated industrial hog producer headquartered in Nanyang, Henan, China, founded in 1992 by Qin Yinglin and Qian Ying. It is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange under ticker 002714 and, since February 6, 2026, on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange under 02714. Control is concentrated: Qin Yinglin directly holds 36.14% of total issued shares and Qian Ying 1.12%, while Muyuan Industrial Group Co., Ltd. — wholly owned by the couple — holds 14.70%; through direct stakes and a voting rights delegation agreement the group exercises over 51% of voting power. FY2025 revenue was USD 21.59 billion with net income of USD 2.32 billion, total assets of CNY 171.741 billion and equity of CNY 78.742 billion. The company employed 127,513 people at December 31, 2025, and operates more than 1,000 standardized intelligent pig farms, over 200 feed mills and 10-plus automated slaughtering plants across 25 provincial-level regions.Strengths: Scale is the core asset: hog farming capacity of roughly 80 million heads a year and slaughtering capacity of 29 million heads place Muyuan among China's largest producers. Full vertical integration — feed processing, boar and sow breeding, fattening and downstream slaughtering under the Muyuan and Muyuan Meat brands — captures margin at each stage rather than buying inputs on the open market. Geographic spread across 25 provincial-level regions limits the impact of any single regional disease outbreak or price shock. The balance sheet carries CNY 78.742 billion of equity against CNY 171.741 billion of assets, and the company reported zero equity pledge across the group in January 2026 after shareholders released 47.5 million pledged shares. FY2025 net profit of USD 2.32 billion was earned in a year when hog prices hit new lows.Weaknesses: Earnings are hostage to the hog cycle. Net income fell from USD 2.678 billion in FY2024 to USD 2.32 billion in FY2025, a 13.39% decline in RMB terms, and FY2023 produced a loss of USD 0.639 billion. Revenue of USD 21.59 billion in FY2025 was barely above FY2024's USD 20.662 billion, showing how little pricing power the model has when supply is long. Capital intensity is heavy: assets of CNY 171.741 billion against equity of CNY 78.742 billion imply substantial leverage, and assets have declined from CNY 195.405 billion in FY2023 as the company manages capacity. Governance is concentrated in two founders, and Qin Yinglin retired as president in June 2026 with cousin Cao Zhinian taking over amid performance challenges — a succession transition at the top of an operationally demanding business.

Founded

1992

Workforce

127513

Facilities

Over 1,000 standardized intelligent pig farms, more than 200 feed mills, and 10+ large-scale automated slaughtering plants across 25 provincial-level regions in China, with annual hog farming capacity of approximately 80 million heads and slaughtering capacity of 29 million heads.

Presence

Domestic operations spanning 25 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities across China, with international technical services and breeding partnerships in Vietnam and Thailand.

HQ

Nanyang, Henan, China

Market cap

$38.8 B

Agricultural ProductsAgricultural Products BrandsAgricultural Products Suppliers

Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited is owned by the farms that supply it. Formed in 2001 by merging New Zealand's dairy co-operatives and based in Auckland, it trades on the NZX as FCG and on the ASX as FSF, but the shares that carry control belong to roughly 10,000 dairy farmers, who must supply milk to hold them. FY2025 revenue was NZ$26.0 billion, about US$16.0 billion, little more than half the US$32.2 billion entry line of the 2025 Fortune Global 500, so the group sits outside that ranking and scores 87/100 here. JBS and Tyson Foods are the two Fortune Global 500 members on these tables.

Its economics begin on pasture. Member farms send more than 16 billion litres of milk a year to 28 automated plants, over 80 percent of everything New Zealand produces, and the co-operative pays a farmgate milk price for that raw material before any profit is calculated. What remains is the ingredient maker's margin. Two consequences follow. The supply base is closed and loyal, because no rival processor can outbid Fonterra for its own members' milk; the capital base is closed too, because a co-operative cannot sell shares to the public, so plants are paid for from retained earnings, debt and the milk price it pays members, which limits how fast it can grow.

The commercial core is NZMP, the ingredient arm that sells milk powders, proteins, fats and cream to food manufacturers rather than to shoppers. New Zealand origin accounts for close to a third of dairy ingredients traded internationally, and nearly all of it leaves through Fonterra's plants, among them Studholme and Edendale, where specialty protein and UHT cream lines are being installed for full production in 2026. Selling to industrial buyers yields a narrower gross margin than branded butter does, and something a consumer business cannot: supply agreements measured in years rather than in supermarket listings.

Greater China is the largest single market at about US$4.2 billion, and the business there is foodservice and ingredients — cream, cheese and milk powders sold to bakeries, restaurant chains and processors — rather than a consumer brand competing for aisle space. That positioning has been deliberate for a decade and explains why China revenue has been steadier than that of dairy companies selling cartons to households: a customer reformulating a cake mix behaves more predictably than a shopper who stops buying yoghurt.

The consumer business is being sold. Under the reorganization running through 2025 and 2026, the Mainland Group, with Anchor among its brands, is being separated so that capital and research go into ingredients and foodservice instead. The logic is a narrowing of purpose: stop spending on brand marketing against global dairy companies and sell those same companies the components they need. It concentrates the co-operative on what its shareholders already own, the raw milk, and gives up the part of the chain where price is decided by retail negotiation rather than contract specification.

Concentration is the risk that comes with the design. Every litre is produced in one country and under one climate, so a drought year, a biosecurity incursion or tighter environmental rules on dairy farming moves the entire supply base at once, with no second region to draw on. A co-operative is also slower to abandon unprofitable capacity than a listed company, because the plants exist to process members' milk and closing one is a political act as much as a financial one. Fonterra holds a share of global dairy trade no rival here approaches; what it earns depends on weather, the milk price it pays members, and how far the ingredient business can move the same litre up the value chain.

Founded

2001

Workforce

19,000

Facilities

28 large automated dairy plants in New Zealand, supplied by about 10,000 farmer shareholders

Presence

Exports to 130+ countries; milk collected in New Zealand

HQ

新西兰

Market cap

$1.5 B

Market

ASX: FSF
Food & Beverage BrandsFood & BeverageAgricultural Products

The Fortune Global 500 name attached to this corporate family sits one level above the company scored here. New Hope Holding Group, the unlisted parent, placed 426th on the 2025 list on consolidated revenue above RMB 280 billion. Membership belongs to the entity that files those accounts and does not pass down: New Hope Liuhe Co., Ltd. is measured on its own RMB 106.856 billion for FY2025, about US$15.0 billion, less than half of the US$32.2 billion that admission required. No Fortune Global 500 place is claimed for the operating company, and the 85 it takes is the mark of a business making itself smaller on purpose.

What is assessed here is a feed manufacturer that has spent four decades building mills. Feed sales reached 29.74 million tonnes in 2025, split between domestic plants and an overseas network running through nearly 20 countries, and the feed segment produced RMB 76.019 billion, about US$10.56 billion, or 71.14 percent of group revenue. Annualised capacity above 33 million tonnes sits behind 240-plus mills, so demand can move between regions without a plant standing idle. Against Haid's 32.08 million tonnes the volume gap is real, and the contest for Chinese compound feed is now between listed companies that make everything they sell.

The overseas book is where growth sits. Sales outside China reached 6.38 million tonnes, up 21 percent, and the company holds top-four positions in Indonesia, Vietnam and Egypt, markets still adding feed volume while Chinese consumption flattens. Localised formulation counts for more there than home-market reputation: a ration that performs in tropical humidity and is priced against local maize is worth more to a farm than the name on the bag. That is why production entities are reported in more than ten countries while tonnage stays concentrated in a few of them.

Manufacturing discipline shows up in two places. Near-infrared testing of incoming material, enclosed grinding and pelleting lines and multi-stage separation against cross-contamination hold batch consistency inside the tolerances commercial farms demand. More consequential is formulation mobility: several thousand proprietary lines can be moved to a low-protein, low-soybean-meal recipe quickly when meal prices spike, defending unit margin at the moment when passing the increase on would mean losing the account. That ability to substitute is a manufacturing asset rather than a marketing claim.

The strategy running through 2025 and 2026 reverses the direction the group took a decade ago. Heavy-asset hog farming is being reduced, external strategic capital is being brought into the pig assets, and the depreciation that came with owning them is pushed off the income statement so that cash can return to the mills. It is the mirror image of Muyuan, which is deepening the integration this company is unwinding; both readings can be right at once, because the two sit at different points of the hog cycle with different debt loads.

The risk is timing rather than direction. A domestic hog downturn long enough to strain group cash flow has to end before the feed engine can be read on its own numbers, and feed sold to third-party farms is a thin-margin, working-capital-heavy trade in which 71.14 percent of revenue does not mean 71.14 percent of profit. Overlapping or undersized mills are being merged and upgraded instead of replaced, which holds capital spending down but caps how fast capacity can be turned towards export demand. The 85 assumes the hogs are sold down and the mills keep running while that happens.

Founded

1998

Workforce

70,000

Facilities

300+ production workshops in over 10 countries; feed capacity above 28 million tonnes a year

Presence

Over 10 countries

HQ

​​·​

Market cap

$5 B

Food & BeverageAgricultural ProductsAgricultural Products Brands

Every tonne of feed Wens Foodstuff Group mills is spoken for before it is made. The contract family farms that raise the group's broilers and pigs must feed the ration its own plants produce, and no feed bought outside may enter those sheds, so the mills have no customers in the ordinary sense and their output is internal infrastructure rather than a product with a price on it. That single structural fact explains tenth place on the Animal Feed Owned-Capacity Index and the 82 that comes with it. Revenue of RMB 103.862 billion, about US$14.6 billion for FY2025, sits below the US$32.2 billion needed for the 2025 Fortune Global 500, and there is no parent above the company and no register position to inherit.

Scale is not the problem. Annual compound feed production has held above 20 million tonnes for years, made in more than 110 wholly owned and highly concentrated feed plants, and internal supply plus specialist sales are worth over RMB 50 billion a year at market-equivalent prices. Close to 400 controlled subsidiaries carry breeder farms, feed mills and poultry and pig slaughter plants across more than 20 provinces, and about 52,000 people work in them. This is one of the largest feed manufacturing systems in China, and it is almost entirely invisible to anyone outside the group that owns it.

The plants are built the way a closed system demands. Elevated fully enclosed buildings, computerised batching and weighing consoles and high-power microwave ripening and drying units are specified to keep a ration uniform and free of medication residue, and toll manufacturing is refused outright because a third-party mill is a route by which disease could enter a supply of breeding stock that cannot be replaced quickly. Reliability counts for more than unit cost here: a formulation failure does not lose a customer, it damages animals the group owns or has contracted to buy.

Formulation research is where the group has earned the most. A dedicated biotechnology engineering institute supplies complex hydrolytic enzymes, xylanase among them, that raise the energy released from wheat and brown rice when those grains replace corn, cutting exposure to a single energy crop whose price is set outside China. The same work shortens finishing cycles for broilers and pigs, and in a business where feed accounts for most of the cost of producing meat, a few points of feed conversion are worth more than an equivalent gain in plant throughput.

Results in 2025 showed the model working: revenue of RMB 103.862 billion and attributable net profit of RMB 5.266 billion, with complete costs per unit falling across both poultry and hogs. The first half of 2026 reversed it, with revenue of RMB 46.747 billion and a net loss of RMB 4.366 billion as meat prices found a floor. Because the feed is consumed rather than sold, no manufacturing margin can be earned on it while livestock prices fall; mill and animal form a single profit centre and move together.

Capital allocation has already responded. Plans for new feed plants in regions carrying surplus capacity were dropped during 2024 and 2025, and the money went instead into dust extraction and digital production scheduling at existing high-output mills, which lifts throughput without adding a site. That is a sensible reading of a market where the group's own livestock numbers, not outside demand, decide how much feed is needed. Wens finishes last on this table because its manufacturing is a support function for its farming, and a support function is only ever valued at what it saves.

Founded

1983

Workforce

52,000

Facilities

Close to 400 controlled subsidiaries, with breeder farms, feed mills and poultry and pig slaughter plants across 20+ provinces

Presence

20+ provinces in China

HQ

Yunfu, Guangdong, China

Market cap

$17.4 B

Food & BeverageAgricultural ProductsAgricultural Products Brands
9BRF S.A.

BRF S.A.

Brazil

BRF S.A. was assembled in 2009, when Sadia and Perdigão, two rival meat businesses from southern Brazil, were merged into a single processor; the Sadia name itself goes back to 1934. The company keeps its registered roots in Santa Catarina and its boardroom on Avenida das Nações Unidas in São Paulo, and trades on both sides of the Atlantic under NYSE: BRFS and B3: BRFS3. Marfrig, the Brazilian beef group, holds the controlling stake, a change that altered the operating culture more than the product range.

What rivals cannot easily copy here is the halal franchise. BRF slaughters and processes under Islamic certification at a scale that places it among the largest halal poultry suppliers in the world, and it does not ship only from Brazil: five plants abroad, in Saudi Arabia and Turkey among others, put production inside the markets that eat it. Exports reach 117 countries, so no single importer's health rules, quota or tariff line decides the year. Chicken, turkey and pork move through those channels, more than 5 million tonnes of meat are processed annually, and certification keeps the company eligible across the Middle East and North Africa, where religious compliance sorts the supplier list.

Brazil supplies the cost advantage underneath it. Feed is the biggest single input in poultry, and BRF buys corn and soybean meal from a domestic harvest among the largest on earth, so its birds are raised on the cheapest grain basket available to any major processor outside South America. FY2025 revenue was R$65.2 billion, about US$11.8 billion, with EBITDA of R$5.3 billion. Around 35 Brazilian plants and some 100,000 employees turn that grain into protein, most of it sold abroad. The margin recovered with feed costs, not with a new product line.

China is one of the largest single export destinations, worth roughly US$1.5 billion a year, and access is granted plant by plant rather than to the company as a whole. Clearances issued in 2025 for the poultry plants at Marau and Lajeado, both in Rio Grande do Sul, widened the list of Brazilian sites allowed to ship into China, giving BRF options when one facility loses approval or when demand moves between cuts. In a trade where an import ban can arrive without warning, that granularity is worth more than another branded line.

The 82/100 score sits below JBS and Tyson on the Livestock & Poultry Brand Authority Index and level with Wens and Danish Crown. The Fortune Global 500 drew its 2025 entry line at US$32.2 billion, close to three times BRF's revenue, so the company holds no place on that list and cannot reach the 90-plus band. The gap is arithmetic more than strategy: a brand estate whose strongest names, Sadia and Perdigão, sell to Brazilians rather than to the world. Category purity and owned assets score better, since feed milling, hatcheries, growing, slaughter and further processing sit inside the perimeter measured by the Livestock & Poultry Owned-Capacity Index, which gives 40 percent of its weight to physical scale. A halal franchise built over decades is hard to outbid; a portfolio of domestic trademarks is not.

Two risks shape the outlook. Animal disease comes first, because a single high-pathogenicity outbreak can shut a Chinese or Japanese border to an entire Brazilian state within days, and certification does not insure against it. Currency and feed parity come second: revenue is booked in reais while most export contracts are priced in dollars, so exchange-rate movement lands directly on the margin. Marfrig's control has already imposed discipline on the Brazilian footprint; the coming test is whether the halal premium holds as Gulf buyers build their own processing capacity.

Listed; NYSE: BRFS / B3: BRFS3

Founded

2009

Workforce

100,000

Facilities

35 processing plants in Brazil and 5 overseas, including sites in Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Presence

Exports to 117 countries

HQ

巴西圣卡塔琳娜州

Market cap

$5.7 B

Market

Listed; NYSE: BRFS / B3: BRFS3

Food & BeverageAgricultural ProductsAgricultural Products Brands

Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. is the largest producer of shell eggs in the United States, founded in 1957 and run from Ridgeland, Mississippi. It is not a Fortune Global 500 member and is nowhere near qualifying: FY2025 revenue of US$4.262 billion is about an eighth of the US$32.2 billion entry line the 2025 list used, and no parent stands above it with a place to inherit. The reason it appears at that size is the profit produced in FY2025 — US$1.220 billion of net income on US$4.262 billion of sales, a net margin above 28 percent on a food staple.

Two different businesses sit inside that number. Specialty eggs — cage-free, organic and nutrient-enriched lines — took 36.7 percent of volume and sell at a wholesale premium, frequently under supply agreements with retail chains rather than at whatever the spot market pays that day. The other 63.3 percent was conventional shell eggs, a genuine commodity priced off a national quotation that can double or halve within a year. FY2025 was a year in which the commodity half behaved like the premium half: outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza removed tens of millions of hens from the national flock, prices spiked, and Cal-Maine's own 51.8 million birds kept laying.

The estate behind those eggs is unusually complete for a company with 4,000 employees. Cal-Maine owns 49 layer farms, grades and packs through 50 plants and makes its feed at 30 mills, with 2 hatcheries supplying replacement birds. Cage-free housing and strict isolation between sites kept the flock near 51.8 million while the national inventory was depopulated around it. More than 1.1 billion dozen fresh eggs leave the business each year, almost all into US grocery and foodservice channels; Chinese revenue was zero, and no other company here earns nothing from that market.

FY2026 showed what the same asset base earns in an ordinary year. Revenue fell to US$2.912 billion as prices normalised and supply recovered, roughly two-thirds of the FY2025 figure, with profit down further still. That distance is the honest reading of the record year: a price event landing on a business turning over a few billion dollars annually, not a permanently higher earnings level. It also explains the shopping list — Echo Lake Foods for US$258 million, the Van's Foods brand assets bought from Sara Lee, the ISE America egg assets and Creighton Brothers — all routes from commodity eggs into liquid egg, omelettes and ready-to-eat breakfast items.

That direction matters more than the size of the deals. A shell egg is priced off a public quotation, so the producer absorbs the whole swing; a formulated egg product for a restaurant chain is priced off a contract rather than a quotation. Cal-Maine also does not own every name it sells under — the Egg-Land's Best label reaches consumers through a franchise arrangement rather than as group property. Its brand portfolio is thin next to the meat processors here, a consequence of grading eggs into retail chains rather than marketing to households.

Two exposures will decide the next cycle. Disease is the first: avian influenza has not been eliminated, and one infected complex can write off a flock that took months to bring into lay. The second is legal — in mid-2026 the company settled with the US Department of Justice and 17 state attorneys general over egg supply and pricing during the outbreak, closing a dispute that had hung over the very year that produced the record profit. Cal-Maine's standing rests on physical control of egg supply inside one country and a mix carrying more than a third of its volume in higher-margin lines. It has no Chinese business to lose and no second country to grow into, which sets the ceiling at 81.

Founded

1957

Workforce

4,000

Facilities

49 layer farms, 50 packing plants, 30 feed mills and 2 hatcheries, in 15 US states

Presence

United States only; no China revenue

HQ

United States

Market cap

$3.4 B

Agricultural ProductsAgricultural Products BrandsAgricultural Products Suppliers

Frequently Asked Questions

05
Why Does A Livestock And Poultry Brand Table Seat Slaughterers Above The Farmers Who Raise The Animals?

A brand table for livestock and poultry cannot rank farming as such, because the farm is not where a brand gets bought, and the two companies at the top of this one make that plain. JBS and Tyson Foods lead on US$86.2 billion and US$54.44 billion, and both turn the bulk of that money over converting animals into meat. JBS runs more than 500 processing plants in over 190 countries with daily capacity for 100,000 cattle, 140,000 pigs and 14 million birds; Tyson holds more than 100 primary production sites and sells into over 130 countries, and its beef division spent 2025 closing plants in Kansas and Illinois because live cattle grew too expensive to feed through them. Neither is a livestock business in the sense a farmer would use the word. One slaughters and trades; the other slaughters and brands.

What the 35% brand weight is actually rewarding. A brand lives where a buying decision is made, and in this industry those decisions cluster at retail and in food service. Seara recorded its highest export volume inside JBS in 2025; Tyson pushed portable high-protein products into American grocery; both names sit on packaging a shopper or a chef recognises. Muyuan's name sits on feed bags, breeding stock and wholesale pork, and in a market where most Chinese pork still moves through wet markets and processors rather than a branded pack, the same industrial scale produces far less consumer recognition. The index measures that difference, and the difference is real rather than a defect in the method.

Where the ranking stops being useful. Read as a measure of who controls the stretch in which an animal becomes meat, the order is accurate: JBS, Tyson, WH Group and CPF earn there. Read as a measure of who can raise animals, it inverts the industry. Muyuan put 77.981 million hogs through its barns in 2025 at a full cost of RMB 12 per kilogram, the lowest in the industry, and grew its slaughtering arm 128.9% to 28.663 million head. On 89 points it ranks fifth, behind companies whose names reach the buyer as branded meat rather than as animals. Nothing there is wrong on the weighted tests, which means the reader has to supply the question the page answers.

What would change the order. VerityRank runs a second table in this series, scored on owned production capacity rather than brand reach, and the same companies land in a different sequence there. That is the honest way to handle the tension: a brand index should not pretend to measure husbandry, and a capacity index should not pretend to measure fame. Forcing one number to answer both questions would produce a score that answers neither, which is why eight of these ten companies are scored twice and why the reader is expected to look at the question behind the table before the table itself.

The call this page makes. A ranking that put Muyuan first would be a production ranking wearing a brand's title. VerityRank scores brands, so the brand layer wins, and two companies whose income statements are dominated by the abattoir, the cold chain and the trading desk take the top two places while the most productive livestock company in the world lands fifth on the strength of its name and its physical base alone. Read the score column rather than the position for the farming story, and treat 92 as a statement about recognition and revenue, not about livestock.

New Hope Liuhe: Why Does The Listed Subsidiary Of A Fortune 500 Parent Score Only 85?

New Hope Liuhe scores 85 because the Fortune place belongs to its parent, and the index scores entities rather than groups. New Hope Holding Group is 426th on the 2025 Fortune Global 500. The company on this page, New Hope Liuhe (SZSE: 000876), is that group's listed subsidiary and holds no position of its own. Its turnover of roughly US$15.0 billion comes to less than half the US$32.2 billion line the 2025 list drew, and the 90-to-100 band on the Livestock & Poultry Brand Authority Index is reserved for companies that clear that line on their own accounts. A subsidiary does not inherit the qualification, and a group's place does not travel down to the operating company that sells under the brand.

What the boundary costs, and what it does not touch. On industrial measures New Hope Liuhe belongs in the top ten. It runs more than 300 production workshops across more than 10 countries, carries feed capacity above 28 million tonnes a year, slaughters more than 500 million birds and raises over 16 million hogs annually with roughly 70,000 staff. Those are the numbers that hold it at seventh rather than lower. What the boundary removes is one thing only: the revenue band. A parent's consolidated turnover includes businesses the subsidiary does not own, so scoring the subsidiary on it would credit a company with money it never books, which is the same error that would rank a brand licensor above the plant that actually makes the product.

The rule cuts both ways on this page. WH Group at US$28.03 billion is the closest miss and owes nothing to a parent: it files its own consolidated accounts and those accounts sit below the line, which is why a group with capacity for more than 50 million hogs a year scores 88 rather than 92. JBS shows the opposite edge. It stands at 167th on the published 2025 list on US$77,182.6 million while reporting US$86.2 billion for FY2025, because the list takes the accounts of the filing entity for the year it covers rather than the latest fiscal year. Every test on this page is applied to one legal entity and its own filings, never to a family of companies.

How to read 85 against the companies above it. WH Group on 88 files its own accounts, misses the line at US$28.03 billion and still scores three points higher than New Hope Liuhe, while Muyuan on 89 earns its turnover in one market and one category. The four-point gap between 85 and 89 is not a gap in industrial competence, which all three share, but in how much of the brand a buyer would recognise in the street and how much of the revenue the scored entity can call its own. Readers comparing Chinese feed and farming groups should compare operating footprints first and scores second, because the scores were built to separate brands rather than farms, and New Hope Liuhe is a feed name that also happens to farm.

What the 85 therefore says. It describes a company with a first-tier industrial footprint and second-tier turnover, and it puts a price on the recognition behind the name: New Hope is a feed brand first and a meat brand second, and its 2025 work – asset disposals, a lighter balance sheet, a fourth quarter dragged down by falling hog prices and biological-asset impairments – reads as a business managing a cycle rather than buying brand presence. The score is not a penalty aimed at the parent's structure. It is the score of the company that exists, and any reader who wants the group should be reading the group's own filings.

How Do Two Farmer-Owned Cooperatives Build Brands Differently From The Listed Companies Around Them?

Ownership decides what a brand is for, and the two farmer-owned businesses in this series keep brands for a different reason than the listed companies that surround them. Fonterra sits sixth on this page with 87 points on NZ$26.0 billion, about US$16.0 billion, collected as more than 16 billion litres of milk and processed through 28 large automated plants in New Zealand, with exports to over 130 countries, roughly 19,000 staff and about US$4.2 billion of that turnover booked in China. Its units trade on the NZX and the ASX, but the farms that fill those plants hold the votes. Danish Crown is the series' other cooperative and appears on the manufacturer table: founded in 1887, unlisted, DKK 65.0 billion, about US$9.55 billion, owned by the farmers who deliver pigs to its abattoirs.

Listed companies brand the product, cooperatives brand the origin. A listed processor spends on brand to raise the price a shopper pays for the pack, and whatever margin that creates belongs to shareholders. A cooperative spends on brand to defend what the member is paid for milk or pigs, and the surplus returns as a payout, which makes every marketing dollar a dollar that is not in this season's milk cheque. That is why the two answer differently to the same question. Fonterra separating its consumer brands, Anchor among them, to concentrate capital on B2B dairy ingredients and food-service solutions follows from it: with 16 billion litres behind it, the cooperative earns more as the certified origin and specification behind someone else's label than as a tenant of retail shelf space. Danish Crown moves the other way, because its members deliver fresh meat into European retail where the pack itself is the product.

Capital is the sharper division. A listed company can raise equity against a brand story and a growth plan. A cooperative can only retain from the flow of milk or pigs, which sets a ceiling on how fast it builds and how long it can carry a name that pays back slowly. Fonterra's 87 sits below CPF on 89 and Muyuan on 89, companies with larger turnover, and also below New Hope Liuhe on 85 points with roughly US$15.0 billion, a smaller business that spends its marketing money on a listed company's terms. Danish Crown on 82 sits level with BRF and Wens on the same mark. Cooperative ownership is not a weaker brand model. It is a different asset, carrying a payout obligation that listed peers do not.

The judgment. Cooperatives build names that are auditable and specification-grade rather than emotional, which is a strength with industrial buyers and a handicap in an index that gives 35% of the weight to brand influence. Any future dairy or pork cooperative wanting a higher place on a page like this one will have to buy consumer recognition with capital its members would rather see in the payout, and the honest question is whether that trade is worth making at all. Fonterra's answer is on the record: it is not.

Cal-Maine Foods: Why Does The Lowest Revenue On This Page Produce The Highest Profit?

Cal-Maine Foods turns over US$4.262 billion and earns US$1.220 billion of net income, a margin near 28.6% in a commodity business where single digits are normal, and that pairing is the most instructive fact on this page. For scale: JBS earned US$2.02 billion on US$86.2 billion, so Cal-Maine's profit comes to about 60% of JBS's on under 5% of the revenue; Tyson earned US$474 million, less than half of it, on nearly thirteen times the turnover. WH Group's net income of US$1.591 billion on US$28.03 billion is a 5.7% margin. The smallest company here outperforms the largest by an order of magnitude on profitability, and the reason is structural rather than lucky management.

Where the margin comes from. Two facts sit behind it. The first is mix: 36.7% of volume is specialty eggs – cage-free, organic, selenium-enriched – which carry prices well above commodity shell eggs, against 63.3% conventional. That mix is a business decision, made over years, and it earns more per dozen with each turn of the cycle. The second is disease: highly pathogenic avian influenza removed laying flocks across the United States in 2025, supply tightened, egg prices rose, and a company holding 51.8 million laying hens across 49 layer farms, 50 packing plants, 30 feed mills and 2 hatcheries captured the difference on more than 1.1 billion dozen eggs. The first repeats. The second does not, and separating the two is the whole analytical task.

Why the flock held. The premium only reaches a producer that still has hens to sell into it. Cal-Maine's cage-free housing and biosecurity regime kept its flock at 51.8 million laying hens through an outbreak that thinned the national flock nationwide, so the company collected the price rather than paying for it in culled birds and replacement pullets. A competitor that lost a house lost the margin and the capital to rebuild at the same time, and the two losses arrive together, which is exactly why housing and isolation spending is the only insurance this industry has.

Scale without diversification. Roughly 4,000 people run that network, which makes Cal-Maine the most thinly staffed business in the top ten by a wide margin: US$4.262 billion of turnover across those staff is about US$1.07 million of revenue per employee, against US$0.41 million at Tyson and US$0.31 million at JBS. It is also the only entrant with no Chinese revenue at all. It is also the only single-category company here: one animal, one product, one country. A single-category producer has no internal transfer of margin, so a bad egg year has nothing to offset it, and no other segment can subsidise a rebuild after a cull. The 2025 result is what that structure looks like in a good year, and the same structure is why the good years arrive with the disease.

The judgment. A 28.6% net margin is a price event rather than a franchise, and Cal-Maine's own capital allocation concedes the point: Echo Lake and Van's Foods were bought to move volume into liquid egg and ready-to-eat egg products, where the earnings are contractual instead of cyclical. The index scores durability, not the peak year, which is why the highest net income on the page belongs to the lowest score, 81. Anyone reading that 81 as a verdict on the business has misread the column: it is a verdict on repetition, and the windfall of 2025 is precisely what the score refuses to capitalise.

WH Group, Muyuan, New Hope Liuhe And Wens: What Do Four Chinese Entrants Reveal About Four Positions On One Table?

Four Chinese companies sit on this table and no two of them occupy the same position, because they have made four different bets about where value sits in China's protein chain. WH Group takes third place on 88 points as a branded processor: more than half its turnover and over 90% of its operating profit come from packaged meat rather than fresh pork, it runs plants in China, the United States, Poland, Romania and Mexico, holds capacity for more than 50 million hogs a year and sells more than 3 million tonnes of processed meat, with roughly US$13.5 billion of revenue booked in China and 106,000 employees. Its bet is the label on the pack, and Shuanghui and Smithfield give it two of them.

Muyuan takes the production bet. Fifth on 89 points, it raised 77.981 million hogs in 2025 and booked RMB 144.145 billion, about US$20.2 billion, drawn entirely from China – the largest single-market revenue base among these four. Its wager is cost and control: RMB 12 per kilogram of full production cost, 98.8% capacity utilisation in a slaughtering arm that grew 128.9% to 28.663 million head, and barns and plants it owns outright rather than contracts for. Where WH Group earns from what is done to the animal, Muyuan earns from making the animal cheaply in the first place.

New Hope Liuhe and Wens take the other two positions. New Hope Liuhe is a feed company that farms: more than 28 million tonnes of annual feed capacity and over 300 production workshops in more than 10 countries, with more than 500 million birds slaughtered and over 16 million hogs raised a year on roughly 70,000 staff, seventh on 85 points and held out of the 90s by a parent's Fortune place that does not transfer. Wens runs a network rather than a herd: 45,000 cooperating farm households producing more than 30 million hogs and over 1.1 billion birds, RMB 13.2 billion returned to those households in 2025, RMB 103.862 billion of turnover, about US$14.6 billion, eighth on 82 points.

All four are walking the same direction from different starting places. Muyuan lifted slaughtering 128.9% to 28.663 million head and now sells pork as well as pigs. Wens is pushing prepared dishes and slaughter capacity under its Jiawei line to move away from selling live animals. New Hope Liuhe wants to distribute chilled meat on top of a feed business that dwarfs its farming. WH Group finished the trip years ago, with processed meat above half of turnover and over 90% of operating profit. Each of the four is trying to own more of the chain, and the starting position decides what the next dollar of capital buys: cheaper pigs at Muyuan, faster brand reach at WH Group, more households at Wens, more feed volume at New Hope Liuhe.

What the order says. Within these four the position column tracks turnover exactly – US$28.03 billion, US$20.2 billion, US$15.0 billion, US$14.6 billion – while the score column does not, since Muyuan's 89 sits above WH Group's 88 at a much smaller revenue. That gap is where the two companies differ in kind rather than size: one owns the brand, the other owns the barn, and the index gives 35% of its weight to the first. Four Chinese entrants, four bets, one conclusion a reader can carry away. This page rewards the company that owns the name on the pack over the company that owns the animals, and it does so consistently, from first place to eighth.